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This article replies to Professor John Quigley's 
recent article on the rather dramatic controversy concerning 
Palestinian statehood.  The present article provides a 
critical assessment of two pivotal Palestinian Unilateral 
Declarations of Independence (UDI) initiatives as of 1988 
and 2011.  It does so both generally and with regard to the 
territorial and border disputes underplayed by Professor 
Quigley's supportive Palestinian statehood argument 
altogether.  
 
In the wake of the codenamed 'Arab Spring' 
tentative spread of democracy throughout the Middle East, 
regional law and order commands legal certainty.  Thus, 
while being sympathetic to the secessionist self-
determination of Palestine under public international law, 
this article offers critical assessment of the latter's unilateral 
bypass of both relevant United Nations Security Council 
resolutions as well as the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral Oslo 
Interim Peace Agreements. The article concludes that 
neither argument to the contrary in support of unilateral 
Palestinian statehood as put by Professor Quigley is legally 
assured. 
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The implications of future Palestinian statehood are 
undeniably dramatic.  They may impose on the jurisdiction 
by the International Criminal Court over alleged war crimes 
by either party to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; they can 
fundamentally change the legal status of the Holy Places in 
Jerusalem and elsewhere in the Holy Land; they may 
uphold crucial geo-strategic regional and national 
implications related to Israel's security concerns; or they 
may otherwise inflict on the geographical continuation of a 
viable Palestinian state altogether. 
In a thought-provoking article, titled Palestine is a 
State: A Horse with Black and White Stripes is a Zebra, 
Professor John Quigley directly replies to a previous article 
by Ronen Perry and myself in the same volume 32 of the 
Michigan Journal of International Law.  Both of these 
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 See John Quigley, Palestine is a State: A Horse with Black and 
White Stripes is a Zebra, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 749 (2011) 
[Hereinafter Quigley, Palestine is a State]; Daniel Benoliel & Ronen 
Perry, Israel, Palestine, and the ICC, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 73 (2010). 
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In his reply article, Professor Quigley tried to rebut 
our earlier reservations doubting his presumption that a 
Palestinian state already exists over the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in their 
geographic entirety.  
Professor Quigley most noticeably argues that no 
later than the Palestinian Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) of November 15, 1988, upon its wide 
recognition by the United Nations and states worldwide, a 
Palestinian state came into existence.
2
  Quigley's analysis 
should conceptually refer to the right to effect the secession 
of Palestine from Israel unilaterally, given the 1988 
Palestinian UDI.  In particular, it begs the questions 
whether such a right can derive from the right of self-
determination under international law and, if so, under 
which limitations.  
With the commencement of the sixty-sixth session 
of the United Nations General Assembly last year, a 
historic admittance of a newly born Palestinian State may 
occur.  That is, given a following 2011 implied Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence initiative perceived through 
                                                           
2
 See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 1 at 755; John Quigley, The 
Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal Court: the 
Statehood Issue, 35 RUTGERS L. REC. 4 (2009) [hereinafter Quigley, 
The Palestine Declaration]; JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF 
PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 
(2010); James L. Prince, The International Legal Implications of the 
November 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Statehood, 25 STAN. J. 
INT'L L. 681, 688 (1989); Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 81-87; 
Malcolm N. Shaw, The Article 12(3) Declaration of the Palestinian 
Authority, the International Criminal Court and International Law, 
9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 301 (2011). 
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the submission of the application for United Nation 
membership by the Palestinians on September 23, 2011.
3
  
The following 2011 Palestinian UDI initiative, does not say 
when exactly Palestine became a state, nor does it declare 
Palestine’s independence anew; rather, it refers to the 
November 15, 1988 Declaration of Independence.
4
  
As no later formal declaration of Palestinian state 
took place thereafter the critique over Professor Quigley's 
adherence to the 1988 Declaration of Independence 
seemingly remains relevant also after the subsequent 2011 
Palestinian UDI initiative.  Within the confines of this reply 
article, additional highly questionable considerations set 
forth in Professor Quigley's reply article are further 
criticized. 
I. Palestine Secessionist Self Determination: The 
Normative Framework 
 
Professor Quigley's reply article is doctrinally rather 
challenging and is incomplete on numerous levels.  To 
start, the accurate legal status of the nascent State of 
Palestine (statu nascendi) arguably still remains a colonial 
territory.  This term is found within the definition of "newly 
independent state" in the Vienna Convention on Succession 
of States in Respect of Treaties, August 23, 1978. It refers 
to any geographically separate territories that are dependent 
upon and subordinate to a metropolitan territory of a state – 
Israel in this case – in accordance with Article 74 to the 
                                                           
3
 See generally Application of Palestine for Admission to 
Membership in the United Nations, U.N. GASC, 66
th
 Sess., U.N. 
A/66/371 (Sept. 23, 2011). 
4
 It is noted however that Mahmoud Abbas is not titled there as 
President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), but as 





  Thus, the Palestinian-occupied 
territories in West Bank, including East Jerusalem and 
possibly the Gaza Strip, arguably still adhere to the latter 
definition.  
 
Professor Quigley analytically ignores the pivotal 
distinction between two classes of colonial territory within 
the United Nations Charter.  In accordance with Chapters 
XI and XII of the United Nations Charter, the two classes 
of territories are self-governing and trust, respectively.  
Both types of territories are referred to as "colonial" 
according to the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 
in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 




In the present case, the Palestinian right of self-
determination distinctively makes a case in point for the 
second class of such colonial territories, namely “trust 
territories”, as covered by Chapter XII of the United 
Nations Charter.
7
  The West Bank, including East 
                                                           
5
 Thus a "metropolitan state" is the administering state of a colonial 
territory.  U.N. Charter art. 74. 
6
 A shorthand term sometimes used for colonial territories is 
"dependent" territories.  Moreover, none of the Articles of Chapter 
XI and XII, actually use the phrase "right to self-determination".  
Their concern was rather with the progress to self-government of the 
peoples of dependent territories.  See, e.g., Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art 2(1)(f), Aug. 23, 
1978, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 971 (defining "newly independent State"); 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State 
Property, Archives and Debts, art. 2(1)(e), Apr. 7, 1983, 22 I.L.M 
306 (defining “newly independent State”); see also id., arts. 15, 28, 
38. 
7
 On the right to Self Determination see U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 
(“To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and 
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”); 
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on 
7 
 
Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, is included in the territories 
formerly covered by the system of mandates under the 
League of Nations, as provided for in Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League.  Article 22 of the Covenant 
mandates fall into three classes.  With one exception, the 
"A Class" mandates (formerly parts of the Ottoman 
Empire) had become or shortly after 1945 became 
independent, specifically Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.  
Unlike what Quigley describes
8 
under the Class A mandate, 
the exception indeed includes Palestine, a British Class A 
mandate.
9
  Following the British withdrawal from Palestine 
in 1948 and a war with neighboring Arab states, Israel 
became independent.
10
  The remaining parts of Palestine 
                                                                                                                    
Questions Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 
2, July 4 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1498 (1992) [hereinafter Badinter 
Commission] (“[T]he principle of the right to self-determination 
serves to safeguard human rights.”); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1988, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 (“All peoples have the right of self-determination.”); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(1), Mar. 
23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“All peoples have the right of self-
determination.”); Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV), at 122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24 1970). 
8
 Quigley, Palestine is a State, supra note 1, at 755. 
9
 Article 77 of the UN Charter states that those mandated territories 
which had not achieved independence were to be brought under the 
International Trusteeship System through separate agreements.  U.N. 
Charter art. 77.  In balance, like with the Palestinian case, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that there was no automatic 
transfer of mandated territories to the trusteeship system.  
International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion I.C.J. 
Reports 1950, p. 128 (July 11). 
10
 See G.A. Res. 18/1, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/S/RES/18/1 (Apr. 23, 1990); 
S.C. Res. 652, at 30, U.N. Doc. S/RES/652 (Apr. 17, 1990); See, 
e.g., Georges Abi Saab, Namibia and International Law: An 
Overview, 1 AFR. Y.B. INT’L. L. 3, 3-11 (1993).  The territory 
became independent as Namibia on March 31, 1990.  Of the "B 
Class" and "C Class" mandates, only one was not brought under the 
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were not brought under trusteeship, yet they are covered by 
the rubric of self-determination.  The International Court in 
the 2004 Construction of a Wall Advisory Opinion
11
 and 
many United Nations resolutions note this distinction.
 12 
 
To be sure, the second class of colonial territories 
covered by the United Nations Charter were non-self-
governing territories.  These were dealt with in Chapter XI 
of the Charter. Article 73 of the Charter states they were 
“territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full 
measure of self-government”.  Beginning in the 1970s, the 
international law of self-determination expanded the right 
to independence to the latter class of colonial territories and 
to people subject to alien subjugation, domination, and 
                                                                                                                    
Trusteeship system under Chapter XII of the Charter, namely, South 
West Africa (Namibia).  Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa). Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, para. 52 (June 21). 
11
 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, at 136, 183, 
197, 199 (July 9) [hereinafter Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory].  See also, e.g., 
CASSESE, infra note 12, at 90-99. 
12
 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 48/94, ¶¶  3, 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/94 
(Dec. 20, 1993) (“Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the 
Palestinian people and all peoples under foreign occupation and 
colonial domination to self-determination, independence and 
sovereignty…”).  See also, G.A. Res. 58/163, ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/58/163 (Mar. 4, 2004); G.A. Res. 55/85, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/55/85 (Feb. 28, 2001); G.A. Res. 41/100, at 162, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/41/100 (Dec. 4, 1986); G.A. Res. 38/16, at 184, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/38/16 (Nov. 22, 1983); G.A. Res. 3236 (XXIX), at 4, U.N. 
Doc. A/3236 (Nov. 5, 1974); See also ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 92 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1995). 
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exploitation.  In short, the Palestinians continuously make 
up part of the former category of colonial territories. 
What Professor Quigley largely ignores is that the 
right to secessionist self-determination by colonial 
territories is still plagued by genuine uncertainties in public 
international law.
13
  Quigley admittedly takes the rather 
incomplete factual approbation of the 1988 Palestinian UDI 
by a large number of states as an indication that these states 
regard Palestine as a state.
14
  Professor Quigley explains 
that there are precedents of recognition of statehood being 
extended on the basis of self-determination by aspirant 
governments before the aspirant government claims 
effective control.  In other instances, he adds that this form 
of early recognition envisages the attainment of effective 
control within a foreseeable future.
15
 
Different than what Quigley assumes for the 
Palestinian case in point, there simply is no binding right of 
secession under public international law.
16
  Moreover, no 
preliminary agreements on the criteria have taken place that 
might be used in the future to determine when secession 
                                                           
13
 See e.g., Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-
Determination: “Selfistans,” Secession, and the Great Powers' Rule, 
19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 137, 145-46 (2010); Vidmar, infra note 31, at 6; 
Report Presented by the Council of the League by the Commission of 
Rapporteurs, The Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations 
Council Doc. B7 (1921); Badinter Commission, supra note 7, at 
1497-99. 
14
 Quigley, supra note 1, at 752. 
15
 Id. at 753 (referring to D.A. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-
determination (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), at 414-
415). 
16
 See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN 





 In continuation, Professor Quigley's 
doctrinal deficiency over Palestinian secession is further 
challenged by state practice upholding how self-
determination arises under one of three legal theories of 




The first type of secession that regrettably eludes 
Quigley's analysis of Palestinian statehood already since 
1988−and possibly since 1948−is based on bilateral 
agreement between the metropolitan state and the 
dependent territory.
19
 Two conditions justify bilateral 
secession: A “clear expression of democratic will” by 
seceding peoples and the presence of negotiations between 
the secessionists and the parent country.
20
 The second 
condition is the presence of negotiations between the 
                                                           
17
 See Hurst Hannum, The Right of Self-Determination in the 
Twenty-First Century, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 773, 777 (1998). 
18
 See e.g., CASSESE, supra note 12; CRAWFORD, supra note 16; 
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 
(Univ. of Pa. Press, 2nd ed. 1996); MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-
DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE THE NEW DOCTRINE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Martinus Nihoff Publishers, 1982); A. RIGO 
SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, 
A STUDY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE (A.W. Sijthoff Int’l Publ’g 
Co., 1973). 
19
 James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation 
to Unilateral Secession, Report to the Government of Canada 
concerning unilateral secession by Quebec (1997), reprinted in 
ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: QUEBEC AND LESSONS LEARNED 31 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2000) [hereinafter, Crawford, State Practice Report], 
para. 17. 
20




secessionists and the parent country.
21
 In this way and 
dissimilar to the Palestinian case, the parent country grants 
independence in response to democratic pressure, thereby 
justifying the secession.    
Professor Quigley’s assertion deemphasizes the fact 
that a lack of bilateral secession will result in only two 
alternative means of unilateral secession: winning a war of 
independence or negotiated independence.  The first 
method is by traditional means of winning a war of 
independence, which Palestine has not done.  Two rather 
successful examples for the alternative model are 
Bangladesh
22
 in the early 1970s backed by India's foreign 




The second method is to negotiate independence 
provided that the central government, in this case Israel, 
agrees to engage in negotiations.
24
  Surely, an archetypical 
central government, like Israel's is not obliged by 
international law to comply.
25
 
Especially after the adoption of the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
                                                           
21
 Id. at 265-66. 
22
 See S.C. Res. 307, U.N. Doc. S/Res/307 (Dec. 21, 1971); see also 
India-Pakistan, Simla Agreement on Bilateral Relations and 
Statement on its Implementation, 3 July 1972, 11 ILM 954 (1971); 
see also VP Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The 
Tragic Tale of Two Cities – Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca 
(East Pakistan) 66 AJIL, 321 (1972) (on Bangladesh). 
23
 Diana Draganova, Chechnya’s Right of Secession under Russian 
Constitutional Law, 3(2) CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 571 (2004). 
24





Peoples of 1960, the United Nations General Assembly 
urged that rapid decisions be made as to the self-
government or independence of colonial territories, such as 
with the Palestinian case.  Yet, there is only one exception 
of the United Nations advocating or supporting unilateral 
rights of secession.  The exceptional practice – rather 
irrelevant to the Palestinian case - has been for non-self-
governing territories, where self-determination was 
effectively opposed by the colonial power.  This became 
state practice in the case of the Portuguese African 
territories namely in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-
Bissau.
26
 In the vast majority of cases, self-government or 
independence was always been achieved peacefully and by 
agreement with the administering authority.
27
  State 
practice depicts that nearly a hundred territories designated 
as colonial under Chapters XI and XII have become 




Unlike with the Israeli government, when the parent 
state is unwilling to negotiate the outcome is less clear.
29
  
As illustrated with the Palestinian UDI of 1988, there 
remain two additional non-binding types of secessionist 
self-determination which Professor Quigley fails to qualify 






 Id., para. 19.  (citing note 21 listing all the countries admitted to 
the United Nations). 
29
 See Milena Sterio, supra note 13, at 145-46; Jure Vidmar, 
International Legal Responses to Kosovo's Declaration of 
Independence, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779, 809 (2009); Report 
Presented by the Council of the League by the Commission of 
Rapporteurs, The Aaland Islands Question, supra note 13; Badinter 
Commission, supra note 7, at 1497-99. 
13 
 
adequately.  The first of two is remedial secessionist self-
determination. It corresponds to the varying degrees of 
oppression inflicted upon a particular group by its 
governing state, whereby public international law may 
recognize secession as the ultimate remedy.
30
  
The Aaland Islands case in 1921
31
 articulated the 
requirements for justifiable secession when the parent state, 
such as Israel in our case, may oppose it, assuming those 
wishing to secede are legally considered “a people”, such 
as the Palestinians.
32
  Yet, state practice herein adds two 
additional requirements, which neither Professor Quigley 
nor the Palestinians have elaborated or established.  The 
first additional requirement is that the secessionist people, 
such as the Palestinians, were subject to very serious 
violations of human rights at the hands of the parent state.  
The second additional requirement is that absolutely no 
                                                           
30
 See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory 
Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 31, para. 82 (July 22) (The Court finds that the 
declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 
2008 did not violate international law); see also LEE C. BUCHHEIT, 
40 SECESSION 222 (1978); Vidmar, supra note 29, at 814-18; Cf. 
ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
351-53 (2004). 
31
 See Report Presented by the Council of the League by the 
Commission of Rapporteurs, supra note 13, at 21.  (League of 
Nations denying the right of the people in a collection of these 
islands living historically under Finnish control to have right to 
secede from Finland and be annexed by Sweden). 
32
 The definition of “people” is somewhat ambiguous. See Vidmar, 
supra note 29, at 810-12.  But see Christopher J. Borgen, The 
Language of the Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and 
the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South 
Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 7-8 (2009). 
14 
 
other remedies were available to them.
33
 Recently, the 
Supreme Court of Canada noticeably applied an equivalent 
standard in its decision on the final denial of secession of 
the Province of Quebec in 1998.
34
 To be sure, the 
interpretation given to these requirements is strict and 
certainly was not upheld in the present Palestinian case.  In 
the background of this are the ongoing bilateral Oslo 
Interim Accords setting, continuously backed by the 
Quartet forum incorporating the United Nations, The 
United States, the Russian Federation and the European 
Union.  
The second comparable non-binding type of 
secession is de facto secession, which is either remedial or 
non-remedial.  In such cases, a population secedes 
unilaterally, thereby leaving the international community as 
arbiter of its ultimate success, namely its recognition by 
other states.
35
  Both remedial and de facto unilateral 
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 See Borgen, supra note 32, at 8. 
34
 Reference re Succession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 281, 284-
86 (Can.) (describing the threefold requirements for secession: that 
the seceding group are a “people,” “governed as part of a colony, or 
subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation,” and when 
it is deprived of “the meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination”). 
35
 Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 284-86.  To 
illustrate, in the latest case of Chechnya's de facto secession, the 
Russian Federation has implicitly recognized de facto secession of 
the former by concluding the Treaty on Peace and the Principles of 
Interrelations with the Chechen Republican of Ichkeria in 1997.  See 
Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between Russian 
Federation and Chechen Republic Ichkeria, May 12, 1997, 
http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rus2.pdf.  
See generally Draganova, supra note 23, at 572-537, 583-87 




secessions may uphold a joint mechanism, questionably 
practiced through the 1988 Palestinian UDI.  In both forms 
of secessionist self-determination, a UDI is used to refer to 
the unilateral act by which a group declares that it is 
seceding to form a new state.  Yet, different than as 
perceived by Quigley, although usually declaratory in form, 
a UDI is not a self-executing act and may not lead 
necessarily to self-governance, sovereignty, or statehood.
36
  
The main obscurity with Quigley’s analysis is that the 
independence of a state is established by both territorial 
control and recognition of statehood by other states and the 
parent state itself.  That is, especially recognition by the 
state on whose territory the secession is occurring, namely 
the parent state being Israel.  An interrelated analytical 









 reiterated the criterion of 
                                                           
36
 See Crawford, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 16, at 123.  But see Quigley, Palestine is a State, supra 
note 1, at 751-53 (arguing Palestine’s statehood is a “matter of fact” 
and that recognition by other countries is not a pre-requisite to 
achieving statehood; recognition merely indicates acceptance).  See 
also discussion Infra Part II.A. (explaining that for decades Palestine 
has lacked sovereignty as Israel has exercised control over and held 
possession of the area in which Palestine allegedly self-governs). 
37
 L. Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 114-15 
(Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 6th ed. 1947) (listing the four preconditions 
of statehood: a people, a territory, a government, and sovereignty). 
38
 See Crawford, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 16, at 447 (explaining that even the exercise of external 
self-determination need not result in independence, “and where 
serious issues remain to be resolved about the constitution and 
boundaries of the putative State… statehood should not be regarded 
as existing already, as it were, by operation of law"). 
39
 See also Malcolm N. Shaw, The Article 12(3) Declaration of the 
Palestinian Authority, the International Criminal Court and 
International Law, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 301, 305 (2011). 
16 
 
state independence.  The latter alternative criterion refers to 
effective sovereignty through self-governance as a central 
prerequisite for statehood.  Even in cases where belligerent 
occupation is present, such as in Israel, self-governance is 
required to obtain statehood.
41
  Thus, it is required that a 
declaration of independence be present, yet it is not a 




Moreover, decolonization state practice clearly 
shows that only where there has been international 
legitimization by the United Nations may the operation of 
the secessionist self-determination principle be altered, 
                                                                                                                    
40
 See Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (1928) 
(statement by Arb. Huber on “…sovereignty in its relation to 
territory”); see also Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 
274, 288 (1st Cir. 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW: PERSONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 201 note 5 
(A.L.I. 1987) (“Some writers add independence to the criteria 
required for statehood. Compare the Austro-German Customs Union 
case ... in which the Court advised that a proposed customs union 
violated Austria's obligation under the Treaty of St. Germain to 
retain its independence.”). 
41
 See Crawford, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 16, at 447.  See J. Crawford, The Creation of Palestine: 
Too Much Too Soon?, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 307, 309 (1990).  See also 
Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at Part II.B.2 (discussing the 
independence criterion concerning the Palestinian statehood 
question).  But see Memorandum from John Quigley on the 
Recognition of Palestinian Statehood 1 (May 20, 2010) (on file with 
author) (arguing that a state may be created even in the absence of 
independence or without independence have “materialized” into 
self-governance thereby implicitly including territories subject to 
competing title claims); Michael Kearney, Palestine and the 
International Criminal Court: Asking the Right Question, UCLA 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INT’L CRIM. L. ONLINE FORUM, 
http://uclalawforum.com/gaza#Kearney (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
42
 See Crawford supra note 16, at 123.   
17 
 
mostly by means of border modifications.  However, this 
would be dependent upon an internationally accepted threat 
to peace and security, which is dissimilar to our case in 
point.  This rationale led the United Nations Security 




Lastly, Professor Quigley's analytical framework 
falls short on an additional fundamental aspect concerning 
the issues of territorial integrity over border disputes, which 
is derived from the secessionist principle.
44
  Once groups 
are allowed to exercise self-determination through 
secession, border disputes may prove more contentious 
than secession.  This grim scenario has eluded Quigley's 
analysis completely, whereby his assumption seems to 
remain that Palestinian self-declaration unfolds their 
complete sovereignty over disputed parts of the occupied 
territories, such as the holy places in East Jerusalem, the 
strategically vital Jordan Valley, or the few settlement 
blocs.  Part II.B.2 of this article will examine that Israel 
argues for a competing title and a possibly negotiated land 
swap, backed by its interpretation of United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
To illustrate how crucially important border 
disputes are within the overall secessionist self-
determination, one is reminded that the blood-spattered 
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 See G.A. Res. 1746 (XVI(, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/1746 (June27, 
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Uti Possidetis Juris Today, 67 BRIT. J. INT’L. L. 75, 148 (1996).  See 
discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
44




Yugoslav wars in the 1990s were related mostly to borders 
issues.  The reason for that has been possibly similar to the 
present Palestinian one, whereby a version of the Uti 
Possidetis Juris (UPJ) doctrine was upheld in creating 
international borders while transforming existing internal 
ones of the various Yugoslav republics regardless of the 
ethnic groups' conflicts therein.
45
  In 1991 to resolve 
problems in the Balkans,
 46
 the Badinter Commission 




In the Palestinian case, Professor Quigley only 
implicitly refers to equivalent borders disputes over 
competing titles by the Israelis and Palestinians.  Instead, 
he incorporates at least all of the occupied West Bank and 
East Jerusalem wholly within a Palestinian state.  Indeed, 
the principle of UPJ is a critical doctrine that offers a very 
strong presumption that a colony or federal or other distinct 
administrative unit, such as the Palestinian Authority (PA), 
will come to independence within the borders that it had in 
the period immediately prior to independence.
48
  There are 
                                                           
45
 See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 
(Dec. 22), for a broader discussion of Uti Possidetis Juris. 
46
 See generally Richard Falk, Self-Determination under 
International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the 
Incoherence of Experience, in THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF 
PEOPLES: COMMUNITY, NATION, AND STATE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT 
WORLD 31, 52 (Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber, ed. 2002). 
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 See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 
(Dec. 22), for a broader discussion of Badinter Commission, supra 
note 7, at 1498 (interpreted the Uti Possidetis Juris. doctrine in the 
Yugoslav opinion broadly, to include instances of self-
determination). 
48
 Tomas Bartoš, Uti Possidetis: Quo Vadis?, 18 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 37, 39-40 (1997); Shaw, supra note 43, at 148.  See also 
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two exceptions to this doctrine that Professor Quigley again 
never discusses.  This article is an analysis of the two 
exceptions to the UPJ doctrine that Professor Quigley did 
not address. 
Part II.A defines the Israeli-Palestinian territorial 
dispute over segments of the occupied West Bank and East 
Jerusalem.  In so doing, it questions Professor Quigley's 
assertion that Palestinians sufficiently self-govern the 
occupied territories in the West Bank and East Jerusalem 
while proclaiming statehood over the entire territory.  This 
article is a specific response to Quigley’s assertion of 
implied adherence to Palestinian statehood.  Furthermore, it 
identifies the two primary exceptions to the territorial 
integrity principle of the UPJ doctrine and explains why 
neither exception has been successfully established by 
Palestine.  The first exception, discussed in Part II.B, 
upholds that parties themselves may agree to alter the UPJ 
rule, both during the process of acquisition of independence 




                                                                                                                    
Continental Shelf (Tunis v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 65-66 (Feb. 24) 
(discussing the doctrine’s historical application in settling 
decolonization issues in America and Africa).  Badinter 
Commission, supra note 7, at 1500.  See Frontier Dispute, 1986 
I.C.J. at 566 (explaining that the fundamental aim of the doctrine of 
uti possidetis juris is to underline the principle of stability of state 
boundaries, but it also provides the new state with territorial 
legitimization). 
49
 Shaw, supra note 43, at 141; G.A. Res. 1608 (XV), ¶ 15, U.N. 
Doc. A/1608 (Apr. 21, 1961).  Beagle Channel Arbitration (Arg. v. 
Chile), 17 I.L.M. 632 (1977); Badinter Commission, supra note 7, at 
1498.  Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. 
Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 408 (Sept. 11). 
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The second exception discussed in Part II.C, may 
uphold the need for acceptance of this bilateral agreement 
by the United Nations.
50
  Both, as said, are presently highly 
debatable in considering Professor Quigley's territorial 
criteria altogether. 
 
II. The Territorial Integrity Intricacy 
 
A. Defining Palestinian Disputed Self Governance  
 
Professor Quigley underplays the mere fact that the 
territory under Palestinian self-governance corresponds to a 
minor segment of the occupied territories. Moreover, 
Quigley ignores Israel's competing titles backed by its own 
governance over most territories therein.
51
 Arguably, 
although Israel's competing titles do not incorporate most 
of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, they, nevertheless, 
bring into question possible Palestinian independence over 
the West Bank and East Jerusalem as long as Israel is 
governing those areas.  
 
Put differently, if Palestinian statehood is declared 
over the entire occupied territory, then Israel's competing 
titles over sections of the West Bank and possibly East 
Jerusalem, coupled with Israeli governance over the region 
as a whole may withstand Palestinian independence over 
the rest of the region in which Israel has no competing title.  
Professor Quigley's analysis is, regrettably, overly 
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  Shaw, supra note 43, at 141.  
51
 See Crawford, The Creation of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon, 
supra note 41, at 309 (upholding that this requirement incorporates 
effective governance over territory that otherwise could be regarded 
as competed in title by a different party, and thus lacking the criteria 
of independence over such disputed territories). 
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generalized concerning the diminutive Palestinian self-
governance of these territories, as explained below.  
By and large, the type of governance adopted by 
occupying-Israel in the West Bank following the 1967 Six 
Day War was military government subject to the 
international law of occupation.
52
  A separate military 
administration was established basing itself on the law in 
force immediately prior to the occupation.
53
 In doing so, 
Israel noticeably adhered to Jordan's existing laws, 
notwithstanding Israel’s nonrecognition of the Jordanian 
pre-1967 annexation of the West Bank.
54
  
What is important to date, however, is that 
following the Oslo I Interim Accord of 1995, and 
growingly until the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum of 
1999, Israeli military governance over the West Bank left 
the Palestinians with effective self-governance only over 
17.2% of the West Bank known as Area A, where 
Palestinians assumed full civil and internal security 
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 Moshe Drori, The Legal System of Judea and Samaria: A Review 
of the Previous Decade with a Glance at the Future, 8 ISR. Y.B. 
HUM. RTS. 144, 146-47 (1996) (for more on the legal system in the 
West Bank during the first decade). 
53
 See PROCLAMATION NO. 2, PROCLAMATION REGARDING 
REGULATION OF ADMINISTRATION AND LAW, issued by Commander 
of IDF Forces in the West Bank Region (June 7, 1967) available at 
http://nolegalfrontiers.org/en/military-orders/mil03. 
54
 See Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Selective Justice: The Case of Israel 
and the Occupied Territories, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 934, 944-45 
(2002) (citing H.C. 61/80, Ha'etzni v. State of Israel, 34 (3) P.D. 595 





 In addition, the Palestinians were left 
with effective self-governance conceivably in the part of 
Area B in which the Palestinians assumed civil control, 
leaving security responsibility in the hands of the Israeli 
army, with additional 23.8% of the overall occupied West 
Bank.
56
 The main point herein, which has been flatly 
ignored by Quigley, is that, as officially admitted by the 
Palestinian Authority itself, Area C, which is comprised of 
the majority of the West Bank (about 59%) remains 
exclusively under Israeli military government control, 




In an archetypical, national Development Plan 
recently submitted by the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) to the World Bank, a detailed depiction by the 
Palestinians of what is titled "Lack of Sovereignty" 
illustrates a minority scale of 17.2% of full control by the 
PNA in the West Bank altogether.
58
  
Moreover, and much to the Palestinians’ dismay, 
the PNA is also, admittedly, lacking control over external 
borders.
59
  PNA does not possess control over the 
movement and access of people, goods, and services within 
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 See Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010, 





 Id. (admitting that in Area C Israel presently retains full control of 
civil and security matters). 
58
 Id. (depicting a continuous albeit slow growth in the size of Area 
A). 
59
 Id. at 16. 
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and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
60
 nor has 
jurisdiction over natural resources, airspace and the sea.
61
 
The treatment of the occupied eastern part of 
Jerusalem similarly foretells the lack of any Palestinian 
self-governance. Soon after the Six Day War, on June 28, 
1967, the Israeli Government extended Israeli “law, 
jurisdiction[,] and administration” by incorporating this 
area within the existing Israeli municipality of the western 
part of the city.
62
  To the international community this act 
was explained not as an annexation but as an administrative 
measure, aimed both at extending the same municipal 
services to all residents of the now-single municipal area 




In the enactment in 1980 of Basic Law, Jerusalem 
was named the Capital of Israel and Israel asserted that a 
“[u]nified Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.” Surely, this 
Act did not create any change in the internal legal situation 
in East Jerusalem, but did express unequivocally Israel’s 
claim to the right to exercise its sovereignty over the area.
64
  






  See LAW AND ADMINISTRATION ORDINANCE (Amendment No. 1), 




Abu Salakh v. Minister of the Interior, 37(2) P.D. 718 [1983] (Isr.) 
(approving Justice Cohen’s opinion in Ruweidi v. Military Court of 
Hebron, 24(ii) P.D. 419 [1970] (Isr)).  Basic Law: Jerusalem the 
Capital of Israel, 5740, 34 LSI 209, ¶ 1. 
64
 Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, 5740, 34 LSI 209, ¶ 1; 
Ne'emaney Har-Habait v. Attorney General, 47(5) P.D. 221 [1994 
(Isr.); See S.C. Res. 252, ¶¶ 2-3, U.N. Dec. S/RES/252 (May 21, 
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What matters herein is that East Jerusalem continuously 
remained in Israeli control instead of Palestinian.  
To conclude, with less than a fifth of territories over 
which the Palestinians practice self governance in the West 
Bank, including East Jerusalem (excluding the separately 
Hamas-governed Gaza Strip), and with some segments over 
which Israel has competing titles; it is highly questionable 
whether the Palestinians present claim for statehood 
withstands Israel's present territorial integrity.  This is 
based on a twofold set of arguments which further weaken 
Quigley's analysis of Palestinian statehood altogether, 
referring to arguable Palestinian violations of United 
Nations resolutions as well as the violation of United 
Nations resolutions as well the violation of the bilateral 
Oslo Interim Agreement.   
 
B. First Disintegration: Violation of United Nations 
Resolutions 
 
The first of two sets of arguments refer to the 
                                                                                                                    
1967);  S.C. Res. 267, ¶¶ 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/267 (July 3, 1969); 
S.C. Res. 298, ¶¶ 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/298 (Sept. 25, 1971); S.C. 
Res. 446, ¶¶ 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979).  S.C. Res. 
476, ¶¶ 1-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/476 (June 30, 1980); G.A. Res. 2253 
(ES-V), ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES 2253 (Jul. 4, 1967); G.A. Res. 
2254 (ES-V), ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES 2254 (Jul. 4, 1967); G.A. 
Res. 31/106, ¶¶ 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/106A (Dec. 16, 1967); 
G.A. Res. 33/113, U.N. Doc. A/RES/22/113 (Dec. 18, 1978);  Per 
the condemnation of the 1980 Basic Law, see also S.C. Res. 478, ¶¶ 
1-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980); G.A. Res. 36/120, ¶¶ 1-
5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/120E (Dec. 10, 1981); G.A. Res. 37/123, ¶¶ 
1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/123C (Dec. 16, 1982); G.A. Res. 39/146, 
¶¶ 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/146C (Dec. 14, 1984). 
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complex and rather contradictory adherence by the 
Palestinians to the United Nations resolutions, which the 
Palestinians have operated under in order to establish 
statehood.  The reservations to Quigley's analysis concerns 
the first exception to the UPJ doctrine; a state practice of a 
need for acceptance of any deviation from the doctrine by 
the United Nations.
65
  Additional support is found in the 
European Guidelines on Recognition of New States in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, adopted by the 
European Community and its Member States on December 
16, 1991.  These provided for a common policy on 
recognition of states emerging from the former Yugoslavia 
and former USSR in particular, which required inter alia 
“respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only 
be changed by peaceful means and by common 
agreement”.
66
 Yet the Palestinian PNA's narration of both 
its 1988 and 2011 UDI’s initiatives are possibly 
inconsistent. 
In particular, the present analysis refers to a set of 
specialized and late United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions, 242, 338, and 1850, which were ignored at 
least in part by the Palestinians. However relevant 
adherence to Israeli competing land titles on sections of the 
West Bank possibly proves East Jerusalem exists. These 
considerations, presently missing from Quigley's analysis, 
are threefold. First, they refer to the inconsistent Palestinian 
2011 United Nations application for membership, which 
took place in September 2011, manifesting a rather 
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 Supra note 49. 
66
 ILM  supra note 49, at 1509 (emphasis added). 
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challenging Palestinian territorial criterion narration.  
Secondly, this part offers a detailed critique of Quigley's 
analysis of United Nations Resolutions concerning the 
territorial aspect, with special emphasis on Security 
Council resolutions 242, 338 and 1850. Lastly, this part 
offers a third group of reservations per Quigley's analysis, 
while considering the probable lack of good faith practiced 
by the Palestinians in their treatment of these seminal 
United Nations Security Council resolutions.   
 
1. The Inconsistent 2011 Palestinian United Nations 
Application 
 
To begin, the first of three sets of argument refers to 
the complex and rather contradictory adherence by the 
Palestinians to United Nations resolutions, through which 
the Palestinians have operated to establish full territorial 
rights.  At the outset, the Palestinian position was reiterated 
in a historical speech by Palestinian President Mahmoud 
Abbas. The speech by President Abbas was addressed to 
the United Nations General Assembly on, September 23, 
2011. This was soon after submitting the official 
application by Palestine for United Nations membership to 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. In his 
speech, President Abbas reiterated the will of the 
Palestinian people for statehood on the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, in their entirety, with East Jerusalem as its 
capital.
 67
 President Abbas indirectly referred to the two-
state solution model in support of a “full 1967 borders” 
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  He presumably backed this position through 
a letter annexed to the application dated September 23, 
2011, from the President of Palestine to the Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon.  The letter effectively refers to a 





Yet, per the issue at stake, namely Israel's 
competing title over strategic segments of the territories 
and the remaining issue of limited Palestinian self-
governance over the 1967 occupied territories, that position 
remains highly questionable.  Thus, regrettably, the 
Palestinian President's speech and supportive letter is 
inconsistent with the Palestinian Authority's application for 
United Nations membership that followed.
70
  In contrast to 
the Presidential speech and letter, the formal Palestinian 
application is based on two constituting documents referred 
to therein.  Both documents further depict fundamental 
inconsistency with the overarching Palestinian avoidance of 
Israel’s competing territorial claims for title. The first 
document is the General Assembly's Resolution 181(II) 
dated November 29, 1947, standing for the United Nations 
Partition Plan for Palestine.
71
  The second document 
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 The Official Palestinian Application, supra note 3; Rabbie Sabel, 
The Palestinians and the Application for Admittance as State: Where 
is the State? 184 Inns Insight, October 2, 2011, The Institute for 
National Security Studies at Tel-Aviv University, available at 
http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1317728523.pdf. 
71
 The Resolution served as a recommendation for partition by 
the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947 to 
replace the British Mandate for Palestine with "Independent Arab 
and Jewish States."  It further called for a "Special International 
Regime for the City of Jerusalem" administered by the United 
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referred to in the aforementioned Palestinian application is 




Officially, the Palestinians are allowed to refrain 
from offering exact national borders with their application 
of admittance as members with the United Nations. Yet the 
two documents, upon which their Palestinian application is 
based, systematically ignore any adherence to the above-
mentioned 1967 borders, to the remaining criterion of 
effective self-governance, and to lack of competing title by 




The first of two documents, namely the United 
Nations General Assembly Partition Plan Resolution 
181(II) recommended a distinct border model, whereby the 
Arab state to be established within the former British 
mandate borders of Palestine would engulf any possible 
Israeli or other claim for even the 1967 borders to begin 
with.  In particular, the Partition Plan Resolution 
historically offered much of present day Israel to be 
considered part of the Arab state.  Such is the 
recommendation that the latter incorporates present-day 
Israel's Galilee region almost in its entirety to the 
metropolitan area of the city of Be'er Sheva in Israel's 
southern Negev region. This is while extracting the entire 
                                                                                                                    
Nations.  U.N. G.A. Res. 181(II) at 133 (emphasis added).  See also 
Future Government of Palestine, available at 
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061
d253. [hereinafter the Partition Plan]. 
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 See Palestine National Council: Declaration of Independence (15 
November 1988), in THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER at 542-46 (Walter 
Laqueur & Barry Rubin, eds., 5
th
 ed. 1995). 
73
 Sabel, supra note 70, at 1-2.  
29 
 
city of Jerusalem from Israeli and Arab sovereignty 





Equally relevant, adherence to the Partition Plan 
with the Palestinian application request further failed to 
mention the fact that like with all Arab states at the time 
when the Partition Plan was recommended, no Palestinian 
leadership or the Palestinian Authority ever acknowledged 
the borders offered in the Partition Plan. Nor did the 
Palestinians offer recognition of it or willingness to act 
accordingly. The record by the Palestinians themselves was 
to the contrary.  Thus, on February 16, 1948, the United 
Nations Palestine Commission reported to the Security 
Council: “[p]owerful Arab interests, both inside and outside 
Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General 
Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by 
force the settlement envisaged therein.”
75
  Palestinian 
leadership, as well as neighboring Arab states historically 
left the newly established State of Israel as a sole regional 
supportive party to the Partition Plan.  Soon after, they 
launched a war of aggression against it in the hope to 
nullify the Plan and defeat the nascent State of Israel 
altogether.
76
  Israel was not admitted conditionally or 
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 The Partition Plan, supra note 71, at 133.  
75
 U.N. Palestine Comm’n First Special Report to the Security 
Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine, U.N. SCOR, 3rd 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.21/9 at 3 (Feb. 16, 1948).  
76
 See Crawford, supra note 16, at 313.  On the approach by Arab 
states and the Palestinian leadership towards the Partition Plan in the 
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threat of genocide made by the first Secretary-General of the Arab 
League Azzam Pasha who declared "[t]his will be a war of 
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RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS 218-19 (1999).  But see Alexander H. Joffe & 
Asaf Romirowsky, A Tale of Two Galloways: Notes on the Early 
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unconditionally to the United Nations based on the 




Lastly, the 1949 Armistice Agreements entered into 
force by Israel and its Arab neighbors, establishing the 
Armistice Demarcation Lines, clearly stated that these lines 
“are without prejudice to future territorial settlements or 
boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto.”  
Accordingly, they cannot be accepted or declared to be the 
international boundaries of a Palestinian state in reliance on 
the Partition Plan or post-1948 war derivatives thereof.  
That is while incorporating the wordings of pivotal Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which are discussed 
hereinafter
78





The second document upon which the Palestinian 
application is inconsistently based, vis-à-vis the issue of the 
two parties’ competing territorial titles, is the unilateral 
Palestinian Declaration of Independence of November 15, 
1988.
80
 A careful read of the 1988 Declaration of 
Independence portrays what has been an intentional 
Palestinian avoidance of any affirmation of its requested 
                                                                                                                    
History of UNRWA and Zionist Historiography, 46 MIDDLE 
EASTERN STUDIES (2010) 655, 671 (discussing the doubtful 
historical observation concerning the exact quote by Pasha). 
77
 See Crawford, supra note 16, at 442. 
78
 Even the abovementioned Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338 in continuation, did not specify the boundaries of Israel or 
endorse the 1949 Armistice Demarcation Lines as permanent 
borders.  See, S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967); 
S.C. Res. 338, U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (Oct. 22, 1973). 
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 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements, Isr.-PLO, art. I, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 
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implemented during negotiations of permanent status). 
80
 See, Palestine National Council: Declaration of Independence, 
supra note 72. 
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borders, permanent or temporary alike.  In its place, the 
Declaration vaguely refers to “on our Palestinian territory” 
implying the inclusion of the whole of Israel's territory, 
whilst mentioning Jerusalem at large (Al-Quds Ash-
Sharif).
81
  And so, dissimilar with the Palestinian 
presidential speech and annexed letter to the United 
Nations Secretary General, the 1988 declaration offers a 
much broader and controversial Palestinian territorial title 
claim altogether.  
 
Moreover, the 1988 unilateral Declaration of 
Independence offers further inconsistency given the map of 
the “Palestinian State” offered by the Palestine National 
Authority (PNA) at the time of the Declaration 
proceedings.  Such a map offers even further competing 
claims to territory as it not only integrates the entirety of 
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the whole of Israel; but 
in fact also parts of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
82
 
Given these troublesome territorial title claim 
inconsistencies with the 1967 two-state solution model, it is 
of no surprise that Israel is not included on the map of the 
Middle East on the official web site of the Palestine 
Authority.
83
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 Similarly, in  Palestinian Authority's geography  page, Palestine  is  
described  as  encompassing  Israel  and the  occupied  territories. 
See PALESTINE: GEOGRAPHY, 
http://www.palestinenet.com/geography/ (defining Palestine  as  
"currently under occupation...located on  the East Coast of the 




2. Evasion of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions  
 
There is a second set of arguments that concerns 
incomplete Palestinian title claims per their larger 
statehood claim (again ignoring Israel's competing titles 
thereof).  It refers to a set of specialized and late United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions (Resolutions 242, 
338, and 1850) that were simply ignored, at least partly, by 
the Palestinians whereby relevant adherence to Israeli 
competing land titles can be possibly upheld.  It concerns 
the conflict of law between the Partition Plan Resolution 
181(II) on the one hand, and the prevailing Security 
Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 1850 on the other; 
thereby possibly upholding Israel's competing title claims 
over Palestinian ones. 
 
The term “occupied territories” originally derived 
from Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which ended 
the Six Day War of 1967 between Israel and its 
neighboring Arab states, upon the occupation of present 
day competing title territories.
85
  Among other things, this 
Resolution “[a]ffirm[ed] that the fulfillment of Charter 
principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East which should include the . . . 
[w]ithdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories 
occupied in the recent conflict.”
86
  Upon its adoption, 
Resolution 242 failed to achieve consensus about whether 
Israel could maintain any land title over some of the West 
                                                                                                                    
Lebanon.  The territory of Palestine covers around 10,435 square 
miles..."). 
85
 S.C. Res. 242, supra note 78, § 1(i). 
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 Id. § 1. 
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Bank and possibly occupied East Jerusalem.
87
  In 
continuation, Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on 
October 22, 1973, after the Yom Kippur War, called upon 
all parties concerned (soon after the cease-fire between 
them) to start immediately “the implementation of Security 




A prime illustration of the incomplete analysis 
presented by Quigley, concerning the Palestinian territorial 
claims, concerns the area of the Jordan Valley running 
across the eastern border between Israel and Jordan.  In 
fact, the vast majority of the Jordan Valley is to date self-
governed by Israel as it falls within Area C under the Oslo 
Accords.
89
 The primary formal justification by consecutive 
Israeli governments has seen the Jordan Valley as a 
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security buffer against an eastern Arab invasion.
90
  That is, 
within the confines of the United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338, Israel's vital need for "secure and 
recognized” boundaries in the region upon achieving a 
comprehensive peace agreement with its Arab 
neighbours.
91
  As a consequence, the Jordan Valley is 
surrounded with an electronic fence running the length of 
the eastern border.  The fence faces Jordan, based on past 
experience of three separate armed attacks or threats 
thereof by joint Arab armies from that front against the 
State of Israel.
92
  To be sure, the Palestinians  envision the 
Jordan Valley as a core part of a future Palestinian state. 
Israel’s justification for its competing titles, flatly 
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http://geo.haifa.ac.il/~ch-
strategy/publications/books/yarden/yarden.pdf (in Hebrew), at 20; 
Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, IDF Must Remain in Jordan Valley, Vows 
Netanyahu, ARUTZ SHEVA (Mar. 9, 2011, 10:41 AM), 
http://www.Israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/142772#.Txb
HvaVa5Vk (for the Israeli claim).  Contra Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, PA 
Rejects Compromise on Jordan Valley Sovereignty, ARUTZ SHEVA, 
(Mar. 9, 2011, 11:57 AM) 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/142773#.Txb





 Id. at 26 (describing the three separate Arab armed attacks and 
threats thereof against Israel directed from the eastern Jordan Valley 
during: 1) The War of Independence of 1948, following the joint 
attack by the armies of Syria, Iraq and Jordan over Israel; 2) The Six 
Day War of 1967 when Jordan attacked Israel backed by Iraqi army 
based in Jordan; 3) The Yom Kippur War of 1973 when the armies 
of Jordan and Iraq mobilized for attack in the eastern Jordan Valley 
against Israel's northern defensive campaign against Syrian surprise 
attack over Israel). 
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ignored by Professor Quigley's analysis, was that 
Resolution 242, backed by Resolution 338, called on Israel 
to withdraw from “territory,” decidedly not “all territory.”  
The borders of such a withdrawal were surely meant to 
reflect both Palestinian and Israeli right to live in “secure 
and recognized” boundaries in the region, while 
considering possible land concessions possibly in favour of 
Israel, as is the case concerning the Jordan Valley or 
segments thereof.
93
  Surely the provision on the 
establishment of “secure and recognized boundaries” would 
have been meaningless had there been an obligation upon 
Israel to withdraw from all the territories, regardless of a 
comprehensive peace agreement between the belligerent 
parties.
94
  Professor Quigley regrettably ignores these 
territorial implications.  Instead, he mistakenly suggests 
that Israel simply has not claimed for competing titles, with 
the possible exception of East Jerusalem or parts thereof.
95
  
There is much evidence that critically questions Quigley's 
assertion, proving Israel claimed competing titles and a 
possibly negotiated land swap.  Thus, Israel has evidently 
claimed title and a possibly negotiated land swap of the 
Jordan Valley
96
 and major settlement blocs bordering 
Israel.
97
  Israel similarly claimed title of East Jerusalem, 
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 See Ruth Lapidoth, Resolution 242 at 25, 26 ISR. L. R. 295, 310 
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95
 Quigley, supra note 1, at 758.  
96
 See Cahaner, supra note 90, at 20; Gedalyahu, supra note 90 (for 
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claim). 
97
 See Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States, 
to Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel  
(April 14, 2004), available at 
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In balance, flexibility on borders offered within 
Resolution 242 arguably cannot be applied to any pre-1967 
borders model.  The reason for the inapplicability being 
that any such early borderlines were neither secured nor 
recognized.  Both the relevant Arab states, as well as the 
United Nations, seemed to have adhered in part to this 
Israeli stand. A case in point is the systematic wordings of 
the ambassadors of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the 
preliminary debates before the Security Council on May 
1967, whereby they emphasized the fact that these “were 
no borders” and these were only “armistice lines.”
99
  In 
continuation, neither the Security Council nor the General 
Assembly called upon Israel to withdraw to the armistice 
lines established in 1949 following the Six Day War. 
                                                                                                                    
http://www.defensibleborders.org/apx2.htm (adhering to Israel's 
claim for "major Israeli population centers" bordering both Israel 
and the West Bank, a.k.a settlement blocks would remain Israeli); 
see also U.S. Senate and House of Representatives Approve 
Commitments to Israel in President Bush's Letter 
of April 14, 2004 (H. Con. Res. 460), available at 
http://www.defensibleborders.org/apx3.htm; See also US recognize 
settlement blocs, PM says, Israel Hayom, August 2, 2011 (for 
President Obama's presumable adoption of this assurance), available 
at http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=562. 
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 Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel, 5740-1979/80, 34 
L.S.I. 209 (1979-1980) (Isr.) (reflecting Israel's resumption of 
sovereignty over unified Jerusalem); Ne'emaney Har-Habait v. 
Attorney General, 47(v) P.D. 221 (1994); See sources in supra note 
65; see also Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 92-93; But see the 
United Nations critique over what was interpreted by both measures 
as attempts to annex East Jerusalem unilaterally and illegally. 
99
 Lapidoth, supra note 94, at 296-97. 
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Regrettably, it should be added, the ICJ's Advisory 
Opinion of 2004 concerning the wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory provided no analytical answer to these 
demanding concerns.
100
  To be sure, in full support by the 
Palestinian and Israeli parties to the Oslo Accords, neither 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) nor the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) established a defined territory 
for the future Palestinian state.
101
  Palestine’s borders were 
one of the permanent status issues left unresolved by Oslo I 
Accord subject to Resolution 242’s borders model.
102
 
Article I titled "Aim of Negotiations" within the Israeli–
Palestinian Oslo I Accord clearly upholds a Palestinian 
commitment to comply with Resolutions 242 and 338.  In 
particular, Article I reads that the Oslo Accords would lead 
to “a permanent settlement based on Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338.”
103
  Furthermore, Article I 
reemphasizes that “[i]t is understood that the interim 
arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace 
process and that the negotiations on the permanent status 
will lead to the implementation of Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338.”
104
 
The Oslo II Accord, to follow, also considered the 
borders of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an 
unresolved permanent status issue, with Israel retaining 
control of external borders.
105
  Given that additional 
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 Id. at 1527. 
104
 Id.  
105
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reiteration of Resolution 242’s borders model, the Oslo II 
agreement states: “Neither side shall initiate or take any 
step that will change the status of the West Bank and 




Further support by both parties as well as the 
Quartet members; namely the United Nations, the United 
States, the Russian Federation, and the European Union, 
was established in 1999. It occurred through the Sharm el-
Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of 
Outstanding Commitments.  The Sharm el-Sheikh 
Memorandum restated the validity of Resolution 242’s 
borders model once again, whereby: “Recognizing the 
necessity to create a positive environment for the 
negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take any step that 
will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
in accordance with the Interim Agreement.”
107
  
Soon after, in a letter of guarantees initiated by the 
President of the United States George W. Bush to Israeli 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2000, Israel was over and 
again reassured that Resolution 242’s borders model was to 
                                                                                                                    
and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 557, 561, available 
at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interimtoc.html 
(hereinafter, Oslo II). 
106
 Id. at 568. 
107
 Memorandum from the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum 
on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of 
Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status 
Negotiations to the Gov’t of Isr. and PLO, (Sept. 4, 1999), Jewish 
Virtual Library (October 27, 2012), 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/sharm0999.html. 
[hereinafter Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum]. 
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remain intact henceforth; thereby: “As part of a final peace 
settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, 
which should emerge from negotiations between the parties 
in accordance with United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338.”
108
  
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1850 of 2008 reaffirmed its support for the agreements and 
negotiations resulting from the 2007 Middle East summit in 
Annapolis, Maryland, by declaring “its support for 
negotiation…and its commitment to the irreversibility of 
the bilateral negotiations….” In support of the Oslo 
bilateral contractual framework adhering to the 242 and 
338 resolutions borders model, it then further "supports the 
parties agreed principles for the bilateral negotiating 
process", thereby reassuring, once again, the validity of the 
242 and 338 Security Council Resolutions.
109
  
As of 2008, the Palestinians’ initial adherence to 
United Nations Security Council resolutions is most 
noticeably comparable with the Kosovarian Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) of 2008. In upholding 
Kosovo's UDI, done in the backdrop of failing negotiations 
between the involved parties,
110
 the ICJ nevertheless 
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 Id. para. 2.  (It further “Calls on both parties to… refrain from 
any steps that could undermine confidence or prejudice the outcome 
of negotiations.”). 
110
 See Accordance with International Law of the UDI in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, para. 85 (July 22).  
“Preamble of the declaration refers to the “years of internationally-
40 
 
unmistakably reemphasized the binding standard of 
compliance with the United Nations Security Council 
resolutions. In the latter case, it has been Security Council 
Resolution 1244, adopted on June 10, 1999, concerning the 
situation in Kosovo.
111
 The Court analyzed in detail 
whether this unilateral secessionist self-determination 
violated international law.
112
 Probably dissimilar to the 
Palestinian case, the Court concluded that the Kosovarian 
UDI did not violate the Resolution's call on maintaining the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia (then Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia) and the other states of the region, 
as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2 of UNSCR 
1244 (an annex that envisions, inter alia, a Kosovo status 
process).
113
 The Court also upheld that the Kosovarian UDI 
did not violate the authorization of the Security Council in 
Resolution 1244 of an international civil or military 
                                                                                                                    
sponsored negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina over the 
question of our future political status” and expressly puts the 
declaration in the context of the failure of the final status 
negotiations, inasmuch as it states that “no mutually-acceptable 
status outcome was possible’.” Id. para. 105. (quoting Kos. 
Declaration of Independence, 47 I.L.M. 467, paras. 10-11 (2008). 
111
 Id. para. 85.   
112
 Id. (finding that (a) Kosovo's declaration of independence does 
not violate international law, (b) Kosovo's declaration of 
independence does not violate UN Security Council Resolution 
1244, and (c) independence does not violate the Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-Government).  
113
 See International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), 
Republic of Serbia, http://www.ic-mat org/icmp-
worldwide/southeast-europe/republic-of-serbia/ (upholding that 
Serbia is the "successor state to what was the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and then Serbia and Montenegro"). 
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presence in Kosovo (part of Serbia, and then called 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
114
  
 The United Nations General Assembly upheld a 
similar adherence to Resolution 242, paraphrased “Dispute-
Occupied” territorial model proposition, for the Palestinian 
secessionist self-determination claim.   The United Nations 
specifically call upon Palestine to “regain its right to self-
determination and independence in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations” in archetypical Article 6 to 
General Assembly Resolution 48/94 of December 20,1993, 
initiated three months after the first Oslo Interim Accord, 
within “Importance of the universal realization of the right 
of people to self-determination and of the speedy granting 
of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the 
effective guarantee and observance of human rights.” 
Given their continuous and well-established 
validity, any ignorance of these resolutions' borders model 
upon Israeli competing titles thereof, should be considered 
truly questionable.  
Instead, these Resolutions could most probably be 
considered lex specialis and lex posterior, whereby 
overruling the former 181(II) Partition Plan Resolution, 
particularly in concerning both parties' competing land 
titles. Truly, the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali 
did not find a place in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.
115
 In fact, it is difficult to assess the exact 
position or value of lex specialis amongst the many existing 
                                                           
114
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115
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devices for treaty interpretation in international law.
116
 The 
principle, nonetheless, was systematically practiced both 
domestically and at the international level, and serves today 
as means for treaty interpretation.
117
 In short, the conflict of 
laws between Resolution 181(II) and the later Resolutions, 
242, 338, and 1850, should be resolved whereby the latter 
overrule the former. That is, whilst effectively adhering to 
concerns over unilateralism over these competing titles, as 
well as other peace negotiations issues between the parties. 
Both Palestinians and Israelis systematically agreed upon 
this interpretive inclination, throughout the Oslo Accords, 
until the 2011 Palestinian Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence Initiative.  
 
3. Lack of Good Faith by Treaty Infringement 
  
A third group of reservations per Quigley's 
incomplete statehood analysis concerns the lack of good 
faith practiced by the Palestinian in their depicted treatment 
of the abovementioned resolutions. The critique herein 
bears special emphasis concerning the Palestinian 2011 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence initiative which 
followed Quigley's reply article.      
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 See, e.g., Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a 
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J. Int'l L. 27, 40-41 (2005).  But see Martti Koskenniemi, Study on 
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  Any possible Palestinian rejection of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 1850 
as discussed, would therefore infringe on the international 





Firstly, there is an infringement of the Palestinians' 
repeated contractual commitment within the Oslo Accords 
to abide by Security Council resolution 242 borders model. 
Secondly, a more provisional Palestinian infringement 
thereof refers to their effectually dismissive interpretation 
of Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 1850 within 
their Declaration Plan Application to the Security Council 
as the nascent State of Palestine (statu nascendi). 
 
This possible treaty infringement may arguably be 
considered equivalent to the applicable duty concerning 
treaties under articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
119
 The duty to act in 
good faith herein has been clearly reaffirmed in Preambular 
paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 and later in 
Article 300 of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
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 On the principle of Good Faith in international Law, see, e.g., Ian 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 18 (2008); The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 115, at art. 
26.  Per possible customary international law application of the 
principle, see also International Whaling Commission, Resolution on 
Transparency within the International Whaling Commission, 
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Yearbook of United Nations Law 143 (2008). 
44 
 
of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS).
120
 Per the latter type of 
infringement by the Palestinians – as the nascent State of 
Palestine (statu nascendi) - even if Security Council 
resolutions are not formally binding treaties upon statu 
nascendi, they still might be perceived in substance as 




Thus, Palestinian ignorance of Israel's competing 
land titles per Security Council Resolution 242 borders 
model, via both infringement tracks, while adhering solely 
to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181(II) in 
their Declaration Application, should constitute bad faith 
instead. 
 
To conclude, the first set of critiques concerns the 
Palestinian imperfect claim over sections of the West Bank 
and possibly East Jerusalem in the backdrop of United 
Nations resolutions. Until there is a negotiated solution to 
these competing land claims and statehood claim 
altogether, these particular sections of occupied West Bank 
and East Jerusalem should not be solely regarded as 
Palestinian territories, but as disputed occupied ones. As 
such the incorporation of these disputed occupied territories 
into a Palestinian state, as modeled by Quigley and as done 
by the Palestinians upon their 1988 and 2011 UDI 
initiatives, remains questionable.  
 
Furthermore, the Palestinian bid for statehood over 
the entire West Bank and East Jerusalem casts a legal 
shadow over their whole statehood claim given their 
minority self governance over less than a fifth of the land. 
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This land dispute may tentatively question inclusive 
Palestinian title within the broader territorial criteria per the 
state recognition doctrine altogether. 
 
Like with other rather exceptional cases, such as 
with the British Trust Territory of Cameroons, whereby a 
particular territory was divided for the purposes of the 
exercise of self-determination, the Palestinian right for self-
determination, it being a Chapters XI colonial territory, 
may possibly uphold certain territorial adaptations.
122
 
These reservations to the Palestinian narration of their 
complete territorial claim are ever more challenging given 
the inconsistence and possibly bad faith they have 
manifested, particularly within the Palestinian 2011 
Declaration of Independence initiative. 
C. Second Disintegration: Violation of Bilateral 
Agreements 
 
There is a second group of exceptions to the rule of 
territorial integrity and the UPJ doctrine, which Professor 
Quigley's analysis largely overlooks throughout his 
statehood analysis. 
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 But see Question of the Comoro Archipelago, G.A. 3161 
(XXVIII) (Dec. 14, 1973) (involving the case of the island Mayotte, 
part of the Comoros Archipelago – a Chapter XI territory which 
became independent in 1975, in which the General Assembly 
rejected the wishes of the inhabitants of Mayotte to remain under 
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Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte, G.A. Res. 49/18, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/49/18 (Nov. 28, 1994).  See also Crawford, State 
Practice Report, supra note 19, at 41 referring to Malyn Newitt, The 
Comoro Islands: Struggle Against Dependency in the Indian Ocean 
48-70 (Westview Press 1984).  
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It upholds that parties themselves may agree to alter 
the uti possidetis line, both during the process of 
acquisition of independence and afterwards, such as 
possibly within the Oslo Interim Accords. Yet, instead of 
admitting unilateral deviation thereof, the parties in our 
case had systematically agreed until the 2011 UDI initiative 
to finalize the territorial aspects of Palestinian statehood 
through bilateral negotiations. This agreement by the 
parties has been depicted above and bears twofold 
implications before Palestinian statehood is finalized ex 
ante, and through the possible prospect of Palestinian state 
succession doctrine ex post.   
1. Palestinian Statu nascendi Competing Title 
 
The international status of the Palestinian Authority 
or the PLO and its ability to enter into legally binding 
treaties is not solely dependent on Israel's recognition of 
alleged Palestinian statehood.
123
 Yet it could be seen to be 
so in part. Put differently, the 2011 Palestinian Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence initiative, alongside Quigley's 
earlier analysis of the matter may arguably conflict, at least 
in part, with the Palestinian Authority's obligations under 
the Oslo Interim Accords binding the parties to bilateral 
negotiations over the abovementioned competing territorial 
claims. However, Israel’s recognition may be seen as 
necessary because the 2011 Palestinian Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence initiative and Quigley’s 
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analysis of the matter both conflict with the Palestinian 
Authority’s obligations to engage in bilateral negotiations 
regarding competing territorial claims under the Oslo 
Interim Accords. 
At the outset, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969 defines several elements, that if satisfied, 
would serve to distinguish a legally binding “treaty” such 
as the Oslo Interim Accords, from nonbinding 
”agreements” or “memoranda of understanding.”
124
  
In our case, Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
have not signed the Vienna Convention. The Vienna 
Convention nevertheless offers useful depository codified 
customary international legal rules in determining whether 
the Oslo Accords are legally binding between these 
parties.
125
 Noticeably, the most controversial requirement 
in relation to the Oslo Accords embodies the notion that 
“the Convention does not apply to all international 
agreements, only those between States.”
126
 The final 
requirement by the Vienna Convention explicitly does not 
cover “agreements between States and ‘other subjects of 
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 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 115, 
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 Unfortunately, the Vienna Convention 
leaves the concept of what constitutes a “State” 
undefined.
128
 Even though the Palestinian Authority and the 
PLO do not seem to satisfy the test of statehood, the Vienna 
Convention recognizes that agreements between “other 
subjects of international law” may still be binding.
129
 
Indeed, Article 3 states that “[t]he fact that the present 
Convention does not apply to international agreements 
concluded between States and other subjects of 
international law . . . shall not affect . . . the legal force of 
such agreements.”
130
 Though the Vienna Convention does 
not define “other subjects of international law,” its history 
indicates that Article 3 was intended to allow states to enter 
into legally binding treaties with international organizations 
and entities such as insurgent groups, without these 
agreements being precluded from being binding by the 
Vienna Convention.
131
 To be sure, several commentators 
have claimed that the PLO is a “subject of international 
law,” thus allowing the possibility that the Oslo Accords 
are legally binding under the Vienna Convention.
132
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 WATSON, supra note 124, at 91 (citing 2 Yb. I.L.C. 162 (1962) 
(Commentary on draft Article I, sec. 8).  The Convention still 
recognizes that agreements with other subjects of international law 
might be binding.  See discussion infra note 134. 
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 WATSON, supra note 124, at 91. 
132
 See e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 126, at 543-44 (claiming that 
Israel and the P.L.O.'s mutual recognition of each other in Oslo I 
“transform[ed] the sides into equal parties . . . In light of this 
recognition, the Declaration is an agreement between two equal 
subjects of international law.”). 
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Professor Geoffrey Watson adds that there is a 
moment at which a sub-state entity, such as the Palestinian 
Authority, may yet begin to bind itself by international 
agreements, even though it may lack complete 
sovereignty.
133
 Like Israel in this present case, when 
colonies sign agreements with their former governing 
states, this moment typically occurs prior to complete 
independence.
134
 Professor Quigley again rather disregards 
this proposition; thereby he fails to incorporate Israel's 
competing territorial claims over occupied West Bank and 
East Jerusalem and Palestinian lack of self-governance 
thereof altogether.  
Indeed, binding the Palestinians to the Oslo Accords 
follows much state practice. Thus, throughout the twentieth 
century there are plentiful examples of states entering into 
legally binding agreements with sub-state actors.
135
 To 
illustrate, Great Britain entered into agreements with the 
National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South 
Yemen in 1967 and the African National Council in 
1979.
136
 Likewise, France concluded a treaty with the Front 
de Libération Nationale Algérien as part of its withdrawal 
from Algeria in 1962.
137
 Moreover, in 1974 Portugal 
entered a binding agreement with the Mozambique 
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134
 Id.  Professor Watson further explains that as a practical matter, 
States would have less incentive to enter into agreements with sub-
state. State entities if they were not binding, since there would be no 
legal assurance of mutual performance.  
135









 Lastly, even the United States has 
entered into agreements with the P.L.O., such as the 




Certainly, these treaties are only binding if the 
parties actually intended to be bound.
140
 According to the 
International Law Commission's commentary, the phrase 
“governed by international law” embraces the element of 
an “intention to create obligations under international 
law”.
141
 If there is no such intention the instrument will not 
be a treaty. In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, 
noticeably, the International Court of Justice considered the 
terms of a joint communiqué issued by the Greek and 
Turkish Prime Ministers, and the particular circumstances 
in which it was drawn up, in order to determine its 
nature.
142
 The Court found that there had been no intention 





In the case of the Oslo Accords, and prior to the 
2011 Palestinian Unilateral Declaration of Independence 




 Id. at 98.  Watson adds that unlike the Israeli and Palestinian 
parties to the Oslo Accords, it is conceivable that two subjects of 
international law could conclude non-binding agreements if the 
parties chose to draft them that way.  See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 








 Id.; See also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 
Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. 62 at 39-44; H. Thirlway, The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1991 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L., 13-15. 
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Lastly, neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian parties 
have terminated the agreements nor have they called for 
that.
 145
In balance, according to the Vienna Convention, 
parties cannot denunciate or withdraw from a treaty that 
does not contain a termination provision.
146
 The only 
exception, dissimilar from any official Palestinian narration 
of the Oslo Accords, is when a party can establish that it 
intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or 
withdrawal or if this possibility was implied by the nature 
of the treaty. Moreover, customary international law of 
treaties adds that a party, such as the Palestinian one, would 
be unable to withdraw from a treaty that transfers territory 
or establishes a boundary, except in the highly unlikely 
event of the treaty allowing for this.
147
 Customary 
international law clearly establishes that any infringement 
of the abovementioned customary rule of withdrawal might 
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 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 115, at art. 
56. 
147
 Aust, supra note 129, at 234. 
148
 Id. (referring to the United Nations Law of the Sea Conventions 
art. 317(3), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261). 
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In particular, moreover, though the Oslo Accords 
envisioned resolution of permanent status issues by May 4, 
1999, neither of the Oslo agreements contained a 
termination clause, nor a provision that the agreements 
would no longer be in effect if a permanent status 
settlement was not reached.
149
 Instead, in both the text of 
the agreements and the actions of the parties until the 2011 
Palestinian UDI initiative, the parties described the Oslo 
peace process as “irreversible,” thus complying with the 
contradictory observation.”
150
    
 
Because this is expressed as an exception, the 
obligation is placed on the party wishing to invoke it, in 
this case, the Palestinian one.
151
 Unless another period is 
established, that party must give the other party or parties at 
least twelve months' notice of its intention, as clearly stated 
in Article 56(2) to the Vienna Convention. Needless to say, 
the Palestinians did not issue any such statement nor did 
they announce intentions to do so. Professor Antony Aust 
further adds that because it is very common to include 
provisions on withdrawal, when a treaty is silent it may be 
much harder for a party – such as the Palestinian one - to 




To conclude, although the 1969 Convention does 
not apply to treaties between states and international 
organizations, such as a host country agreement, insofar as 
the rules of the Convention reflect the rules of customary 
international law applicable to treaties with international 
organizations, they continuously apply in the present 
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 If so, any deviation or withdrawal from the Oslo 
Interim Accords by the Palestinians, through the 2011 UDI 
initiative, concerning the territorial criteria for statehood 
and disputed occupied territories are therefore questionable, 
but overlooked in Professor Quigley's analysis. 
 
2. Of Palestinian State Succession   
 
Within the second group of treaty law exceptions to 
the rule of territorial integrity and the UPJ doctrine, which 
Professor Quigley's analysis ignores, exists a second 
critique. This critique concerns the prospect whereby 
Palestinian statehood already exists or may soon exist, and 
a future Palestinian state would dismiss Israel's competing 
land title ex post facto, presumably applying the state 
succession doctrine. 
State succession, surely, is the term used to refer to 
the complex of legal issues that arise when there is a 
change of sovereignty with respect to a particular 
territory.
154
 The concern of the law of state succession is 
with the consequences of a change of sovereignty in fields 
such as succession to treaties, state property, archives and 
debt, and the nationality of natural and legal persons.
155
 A 
state which acquires territory, or a new state which comes 
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into existence after a succession, such as the Palestinian 
state, is referred to as a ”successor state,” and the state 
which has lost territory, such as Israel, is referred to as the 
“predecessor state.”
156
 It should be stressed that the law of 
state succession assumes that a change of sovereignty has 
occurred in accordance with international law, which as 
previously explained would be highly questionable in the 




Yet, even if a Palestinian state is already said to 
exist, then the new Palestinian state will succeed without 
any further action to the Oslo Accords. The Palestinian 
state will arguably succeed at least to the legal situation 
created by them. This state succession customary principle 
concerns in particular Israel's effective governance of 
occupied territories, under competing Israeli title especially 
according to the United Nations Resolutions 242, 338, and 
1850. State succession is a well-established principle, yet 
its exact extent is not.
158 
More particularly, since the 
Second World War, the practice of newly independent 
countries replacing former colonies has not been 
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 It is therefore impossible to promulgate a set 
of rules of customary law on state succession applicable in 
such situations. 
With that said, Quigley's 1988 Palestinian statehood 
argument possibly falters treaty law herein. To begin with, 
the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in 
respect of Treaties provides that a successor state will 
automatically succeed to all of its predecessor’s treaties 
according to Art. 34(1)(a). Importantly, in the case of so-
called “newly independent states,” defined basically as 
former colonies,
160
 the rule would still apply.
161
  
In balance however, two theories of state succession 
did evolve and led to state practice, which may be applied 
in our case. The first is the clean slate doctrine,
162
 whereby 
the new state is free to pick and choose which treaties it 
will succeed to. This approach was followed most famously 
by the United States when it gained its independence.
163
 As 
explained, the doctrine however did not apply thus far to 
cases whereby treaties concerned territorial rights, such as 
Israel's competing territorial titles embodied into the 242 
borders' model. In the latter cases, state practice led new 
states to normally be bound by former treaties thereof.
164
 
A second even wider theoretical structure over state 
succession and practice evolved around the nineteenth 
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century and henceforth is referred to as “universal 
succession.” It persisted up to the 1960s. Accordingly, the 
new state inherited all the treaty rights and obligations of 
the former power in so far as they had been applicable to 
the territory before independence. For example, this 
approach was reflected in the devolution agreements 
entered into by Iraq in 1931 and by some former Asian 
colonies in the 1940s and 1950s. To further illustrate, from 
1955, all former British colonies in West Africa, except for 
Gambia, concluded devolution agreements with the United 
Kingdom.
165
 These provided that, as from the date of 
independence, all obligations and responsibilities of the 
United Kingdom which arose from “any valid international 
instrument” would be assumed by the new state “in so far 
as such instruments may be held to have application” to it; 
and the rights and benefits previously enjoyed by the 
United Kingdom by virtue of the application of such 
instruments to the former colony would be enjoyed by the 
new state.
166
 Similarly, most French colonies in Africa 
regarded themselves as successors to pre-independence 
treaties, and made declarations to that effect, which they 
notified to the United Nations Secretary General.
167
  
To conclude, a future Palestinian state may not 
easily ignore its bilateral commitment towards negotiation 
of secure borders with Israel. That is, given solid state 
practice applying the state succession doctrine in favour of 
commitment to the Oslo Accords' borders model as 
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constituted by the United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242, 338, and 1850. 
Conclusion 
  
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 
338, and 1850 all provide for the legal framework for a 
future negotiated two-state solution. The international 
community steadily supports these legal instruments. This 
framework also mandates that bilateral direct negotiations 
achieve a comprehensive peace agreement between all the 
parties to the Israeli-Arab conflict, including the 
Palestinians. The 2005 Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip, as well as certain negotiated withdrawals from 
additional Palestinian territory within the West Bank, may 
give room for certain confidence that such negotiations 
may finally lead to a two state solution living side by side 
in peace and security. Earlier successfully negotiated peace 
agreements between Israel and its Egyptian and Jordanian 
neighbours may reiterate that expectation. 
Yet, with less than a fifth of the territory over which 
the Palestinians presently practice self-governance in the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem, and in the backdrop of 
Israel's competing title over strategic segments, it remains 
truly questionable whether a unilateral bypass on 
Palestinian statehood over the entire alleged Palestinian 
territory, even including the separate Hamas-governed 
Gaza Strip, would withstand Israel's territorial integrity and 
the rule of public international law.  
In reply to Professor John Quigley, this article 
considers two set of arguments which further question 
58 
 
Quigley's justification for Palestinian territorial claims and 
possibly Palestinian statehood altogether. These refer to 
arguable Palestinian violations of pivotal United Nations 
resolutions over territorial aspects. These also refer to 
Palestinian violation of the bilateral Oslo Interim 
Agreements, especially in the backdrop of the second 
Palestinian Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
initiative in 2011.  In conclusion, Quigley's unilateral 
Palestinian statehood proposition is not only deeply legally 
questionable, but may further exacerbate existing political 
controversies to the detriment of both Israelis and 
Palestinians alike. 
